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THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SHORELINE:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS TO THE
NATURAL AND NOURISHED DRY SAND
BEACHES OF NORTH CAROLINA
JOSEPH J. KALo*
North Carolinians have long assumed that the dry sand beaches of
North Carolina are public recreational areas on which beachgoers
can sunbathe, play volleyball, and engage in other water-related
activities. This assumption is being challenged in litigation
instigated by some owners of oceanfront property located in the
northern Outer Banks. In this Article, the author examines the
issues of who owns the dry sand beaches of the state and whether
the public may be excluded from these beaches. The author
concludes that, unless the beach has been the subject of a publicly
financed beach nourishment project, the oceanfront property
owner's legal title extends to the mean high-tide line and would
encompass the dry sand beach. The oceanfront property owner
does not, however, have legal title to dry sand beaches that are the
product of a publicly financed beach nourishment project; such
beaches are publicly-owned and open to public use. Although
other dry sand beaches are privately-owned, the author
nonetheless asserts that the public may not be excluded from these
dry sand beach areas. The author concludes that, under either the
common law public trust doctrine or the common law doctrine of
custom, the public is legally entitled to use privately-owned dry
sand beaches for water-related recreational activities.
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INTRODUCrION
This Article examines the issue of the location of the seaward
boundary of oceanfront property in North Carolina and the
relationship between that boundary and the public's right to use the
dry sand beaches of North Carolina for recreational purposes. Since
the existence of this right is the subject of current litigation, Part I of
this Article discusses that litigation and explains why the battle over
the public's right to use the dry sand beaches of the state has recently
arisen in North Carolina.' The case, Giampa v. Currituck County,
2
commonly referred to as the Whalehead litigation,3 is being litigated
in the North Carolina Superior Court. A central issue in the
Whalehead litigation is the location of the seaward boundary of
privately-owned oceanfront property because all lands and waters
lying seaward of the boundary line are public trust lands and waters,
open to public trust uses, which include recreational activities.4 Thus,
1. See infra notes 9-41 and accompanying text.
2. No. 98 CvS 153 (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19, 1998).
3. The suit is commonly referred to as the Whalehead litigation because the
plaintiffs' oceanfront land is situated in the 860 lot of the Whalehead Club Beach
development located near Corolla, on the northern Outer Banks. See Martha Quillin,
Public Beach or Private Land?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 5, 1998, at 1A.
The development is named after a very large nearby hunting lodge, built by Marie Louise
Knight during the 1930s. Knight built the Whalehead Club for her own use when she was
denied admittance to the all-male hunting clubs of the day. See Albemarle, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & THE LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 18,1998, at B4.
4. Public trust lands are typically defined as lands lying under navigable waters which
are held in a public trust by the state and are open to the public for public trust uses.
Lands lying below the mean low-water mark are, by definition, lands lying under
navigable waters. Lands under navigable waters also include those lands lying between
the mean high-water mark (or mean high-tide line) and the mean low-water mark (or
mean low-tide line) even though, at times, such lands will not be covered by ocean waters.
See, e.g., DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., NATIONAL PUBLIC TRUST STUDY, PUTTING THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE To WORK 26, 59 (1990). Public trust use rights are defined
narrowly in some jurisdictions and more broadly in others. See, e.g., id at 129-34. In their
broader form the rights include commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing, and various forms
of water-related recreation. See id at 132-33. Although specifically addressing adverse
possession claims to public trust lands, title 1, section 45.1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes also provides a definition of "public trust rights," stating:
As used in this section, "public trust rights" means those rights held in trust by
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on which side of the line the dry sand beach falls has an important
bearing on the existence of the public's right to use the beach for
recreational purposes.
Part II of this Article examines the definition of the term mean
high-water mark because, under North Carolina law, the seaward
boundary of oceanfront property ordinarily is the mean high-water
mark. Then, because ocean shorelines are highly dynamic, unstable,
shifting geologic features, changing under the pressure of winds,
waves, and storms, Part III addresses the important question of what
effect, if any, natural changes of the contours of the shoreline have on
the location of the boundary.6 Since the contours of the shoreline
may also be altered by publicly funded beach nourishment projects,
Part IV of this article analyzes the effect of such projects on the
location of the seaward boundary.7 Finally, although the location of
the seaward boundary of oceanfront property will determine whether
technical legal title to the dry sand beach is privately held or held as
public trust lands, even if title to the dry sand beach is in fact privately
held, private title does not necessarily preclude public use of the dry
sand beach for recreational and other public trust uses. Whether any
such private title is encumbered by public trust use rights is discussed
in Part V.8
I. WHY THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO T=E DRY SAND BEACH
COMES LATE TO NORTH CAROLINA
The Whalehead litigation challenges the public's right to use the
dry sand beaches of the state for recreational purposes. The
plaintiffs, oceanfront9 property owners, 10 contend that the seaward
the State for the use and benefit of the people of the State in common. They are
established by common law as interpreted by the courts of this State. They
include, but are not limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy
all recreational activities in the watercourses of the State and the right to freely
use and enjoy the State's ocean and estuarine beaches and public access to the
beaches.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (1999).
5. See infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
9. The traditional term for oceanfront property is "littoral," derived from the Latin
word litus for seashore. "Littoral rights" are those unique rights associated with
oceanfront property. The term "riparian" historically referred to property along rivers
and streams. Today, "riparian" is commonly used to refer to any land located adjacent to
a waterbody, and "riparian rights" refer to the rights associated with the ownership of such
property. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01, at 87-89 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
1991).
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boundary of their property is the mean high-water mark and that
therefore they hold legal title to the dry sand beach." As legal title
holders, they assert that they have the right to exclude the public
from their dry sand beaches.1 2 Under the plaintiffs' view, public use is
limited to that portion of the beach lying below the mean high-water
mark, an area commonly referred to as the "wet sand beach"1 3 or
foreshore.14
10. All claims of non-oceanfront property owners in the case were dismissed. See
Giampa v. Currituck County, No. 98 CvS 153 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) (Order on
Motion to Dismiss).
11. See Complaint at 44, Giampa v. Currituck County (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19,
1998) (No. 98 CvS 153).
12. See id. at 44-47. In Cooper v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1991), a
federal tax case, the district court supported the contention of the plaintiffs that the dry
sand beach is privately-owned, stating that:
In the absence of clear precedent from the North Carolina Supreme Court on the
application of the public trust doctrine, the court concludes that the nature of
plaintiffs' ownership is determined appropriately by statute. Private ownership
in the dry sand is expressly established in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 77-20.
See id. at 835.
To the extent that Cooper suggests that the public may not be excluded from the
dry sand beach, the State has always contended that the district court's conclusion was
erroneous. In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in
the Whalehead litigation, the State asserted that: "In Cooper, the federal court
erroneously interpreted N.C.G.S. § 77-20 to establish the entire dry sand beach in private
ownership to the exclusion of any public rights." Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings at 24, Giampa v. Currituck County (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June
19,1998) (No. 98 CvS 153).
13. The area between the mean high and mean low-water mark is called the "wet sand
beach." See, e.g., SLADE, supra note 4, at 25. The land above the mean high-water mark
is the "dry sand beach." See, e.g., DAvJD BROWER, ACCESS TO THE NATION'S BEACHES:
LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 19-20 (1978). It should be noted that, in section
1-45.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the General Assembly was vague as to the
meaning of the word "beaches." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (1999). The legislation
does not specifically define "beaches" as including both the wet sand beach and the dry
sand beach. See id.; see also supra note 4 (reciting the text of the statute).
14. The term "foreshore" is generally understood to mean the area lying between the
mean low-water mark and the mean high-water mark. This does not include the dry sand
beach. In West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 326 S.E.2d 601 (1985), the North Carolina Supreme
Court observed:
The longstanding right of the public to pass over and along the strip of land lying
between the high-water mark and the low-water mark ... is well established
beyond need of citation. In North Carolina private property fronting coastal
water ends at the high-water mark and the property lying between the high-water
mark and the low-water mark known as the "foreshore" is the property of the
State.
Id. at 60,326 S.E.2d at 608 (emphasis added); see also Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v.
Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 301-02, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (discussing
foreshore land).
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In some coastal states this battle over the public's right to use dry
sand beaches was fought in the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the early
1980s.11 In some states, the public secured the right; in others it did
not. At one extreme are states, such as Connecticut, where privately-
owned dry sand beaches are not open to public use. 6 At the other
extreme are states, such as Oregon, where all oceanfront dry sand
15. Professor Marc R. Poirier states:
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the public use of beaches became a highly
contested issue. Ocean beaches were more and more congested,-due to increased
recreational use and enclosure of portions of beaches in connection with new
housing developments, highrises, and industrial development. In response,
private owners often reasserted their ownership rights and excluded others from
beaches that had in previous decades been used by fishermen and bathers
without incident ....
So beach access became a legal and political issue during the late 1960s and
1970s in most of the populous coastal states. In varying combinations, pressure
to open or reopen the beaches was brought to bear through litigation or
legislative action.
Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice And The Beach Access Movements Of The 1970s
In Connecticut And New Jersey: Stories Of Property And Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV.
719, 742-43, 745 (1996). The litigation over beach access continued into the early 1980s.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 368-69 (N.J. 1984)
(holding that the general public could not be excluded from a dry sand beach owned by a
quasi-public body).
16. See Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d 1153,1156-57 (Conn. 1981). Historically, in most
coastal states ("high-tide states"), public use of coastal lands and waters has been limited
to those areas lying beneath navigable waters, which are those lands and waters seaward
of the mean high-tide line. Title to the areas seaward of the mean high-tide line is in the
state and held as public trust lands and available for public use. See, e.g., SLADE, supra,
note 4, at 25-26, 59-60; A. DANIELTARLOCK, LAW OFWATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
§ 3.09[3][c], at 3-44 to 3-45 (1998). Public-trust lands and, therefore, public trust use rights
do not extend to areas above the mean high-tide line (the dry sand beach). In the late
1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, efforts were made in some high-tide states to secure for the
public the right to use privately-owned dry sand beaches. In some instances these efforts
were successful. See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358 (applying the public trust doctrine to
the dry sand beach owned by a quasi-public body); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough
of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51-54 (N.J. 1972) (applying the public trust doctrine to a
municipally-owned dry sand beach immediately landward of the mean high-water mark);
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (recognizing a common law
customary right of the public to use the dry sand beach). In five Atlantic coast states
("low-tide states"), the seaward boundary of privately-owned oceanfront property is the
mean low-tide line. See, e.g., SLADE, supra note 4, at 59; TARLOCK, supra, at 3-45.
However, the privately-owned area between mean high-tide line and mean low-tide line
(wet sand beach) is subject to some public trust use rights. In those states, the litigation
has centered on public use of this area and what activities are included in "public trust use
rights." See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me. 1989) (holding that a
statute defining public rights to include use of intertidal land for recreational purposes
constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property); In re Opinion of the Justices,
313 N.E.2d 561, 569-70 (Mass. 1974) (holding that proposed legislation granting public the
right to walk on that portion of the beach above the mean low-water mark would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property rights).
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beaches are open to the public. 7 In between lie states, such as New
Jersey, in which the public has the right to use some privately-owned
dry sand beaches under some circumstances."
So, why is this battle over the beach coming so late to North
Carolina? The answer to that question lies in the general
development of the northern Outer Banks and, in particular, in the
marketing of the Whalehead development. The legal and cultural
views of the people who purchased oceanfront property in
Whalehead also contributed to the timing of this battle.
Development came late to northern Currituck Banks, 9 that
portion of the Outer Banks in which the village of Corolla and the
Whalehead Club subdivision are located. Twenty-five or thirty years
ago, there were few permanent residents in the area. In 1978, the
village of Corolla, with a permanent population of twenty-two,
consisted of a church, post office, store, and several private homes."
Only the locals, the few summer residents, surf fishermen, and the
more adventurous vacationers used the neighboring beaches.21
Because the area lacked convenient access, it remained
unpopulated, undeveloped, and underutilized for a long periodP To
17. See, e.g., Hay, 462 P.2d at 673 (recognizing a common law customary right of the
public to use the dry sand beach).
1& See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358 (applying the public trust doctrine to dry sand
owned by a quasi-public body); Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 51-54 (applying the
public trust doctrine to municipally-owned dry sand beach immediately landward of the
mean high-water mark).
19. Currituck Banks is a section of the Outer Banks, separated from the North
Carolina mainland by Currituck Sound, extending from the Virginia border to the north
down to Kitty Hawk to the south.
20. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ISLANDS, CAPES, AND SOUNDS 82 (1982). In
1970, the total population of Currituck County, which consists of a large peninsula
connected to the mainland and the portion of the Outer Banks in which Corolla is located,
was only about 7000 permanent residents. See id. at 90. By 1980, the population had
reached approximately 10,000. By 1998, the population had increased to 17,908. See
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, NORTH CAROLINA (OUTSIDE
METROPOLITAN AREAS), § 1 (1990).
Obtaining statistics for Corolla, the only inhabited Currituck County community
on the Outer Banks, is difficult because, apparently due to its small size, such information
is not separately compiled. By 1990, however, in the census block made up of Corolla, the
Whalehead Development, and one neighboring development, there were 360 permanent
residents and 1330 housing units, almost all of which were summer-occupied. Id at 32. By
2000, there were 2500 houses on Currituck Banks, with a permanent population of
approximately 500 people. See Gilbert M. Gaul & Anthony R. Wood, Foundations on
Sand; Development: Along the Barrier Islands of the Atlantic Coast, Natural Disasters are
Waiting for Their Moment, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 2,2000, at 16B.
21. See Quillin, supra note 3, at IA.
22. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 91-102 (describing part of the lengthy
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the north, across the Virginia state line, is the Back Bay National
Wildlife Refuge, and just north of that is Virginia Beach. To protect
the refuge from what would have been a steady stream of traffic, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service required special permits to
travel to Currituck Banks; permits were issued very sparingly, even to
permanent residents and other property owners living south of the
refuge in North CarolinaP Access to the northern part of Currituck
Banks from the south was no easier. The state road ended just north
of Duck, at the county line. The area to the north of Duck and just
south of Corolla was owned by a private hunting club and a
developer.24 A large steel gate blocked the road, and a guard would
tell the casual visitor that the road was private. 5  But even that
private road ended a few miles south of Corolla.
Two unpaved "roads" or driving along the beach were the only
means of public access to Corolla and the area north. One road was
along the sound shoreline and the other passed through the dunes
along the ocean side.26 Neither was always passable. The third route,
along the beach, required negotiating the wet and dry sand with
careful attention to the tides.2 7 One needed either a beach buggy or a
four-wheel drive vehicle, or needed to be extraordinarily adept at
driving on the sand to get from Duck to Corolla.8 Until the early
1980s, when the state road was extended from the Currituck county
struggle to get a public road extended from north of Duck to Corolla).
23. See id. at 93.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. In 1985, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 326
S.E. 2d 601 (1985), that there was sufficient evidence to find the existence of a public
prescriptive easement over the two unimproved and unpaved roads. See itL at 50-51, 326
S.E.2d at 611. The conditions and difficulties encountered in using the two roads are
described in detail in the court's opinion. See id at 41-45, 326 S.E.2d at 606-08.
27. In West v. Slick, the court stated that, "much of the testimony indicated that
members of the public also regularly used the foreshore area to make their way to and
from Corolla." Md. at 60, 326 S.E.2d at 617. As to the right of the public to use the
foreshore, the court emphatically stated: "We once again affirm the rule that passage by
the public by foot, vehicle, and boat must be free and substantially unobstructed over the
entire width of the foreshore." Id at 62, 326 S.E.2d at 618. The foreshore to which the
court referred could mean the entire dry sand beach because four-wheel drive and other
vehicles generally do not drive in the surf and may drive on either the wet sand or dry sand
depending on whether the base is firm enough for adequate traction.
28. It was also possible to reach Corolla by boat, see, e.g., SCHOENBAUM, supra note
20, at 82, or, with special permission, by way of the gated private road that ended just
south of Corolla, and then along the beach or sound shoreline. See id. at 93; see also
Quillin, supra note 3, at 1A (noting that in the mid-1970s, the Whalehead development
"was best accessed by a four-wheel drive along the beach").
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line to Corolla,29 the area north of Duck essentially was cut off from
the rest of North Carolina and from Virginia. 0
Despite the lack of convenient access during the 1970s and early
1980s, some limited development did occur in the Corolla area. It
was during the mid-1970s that the Whalehead Club development
began.31 The developers marketed the Whalehead Club in Virginia,
New Jersey, New York, and other northern states as an exclusive,
isolated area of the Outer Banks.32 Lots were sold, and very
expensive summer residences were built in this remote corner of the
North Carolina coast.
33
The out-of-state buyers came from areas with different customs
and legal traditions. Many of these buyers came from states, like New
Jersey, where dry sand beaches were regarded as private or largely
private3 4 Consequently, many of them brought their expectations of
29. Obtaining precise information on the extension of the state road is difficult, but
according to long-time Corolla resident and local historian, Norris Austin, the road was
completed sometime in 1983 or 1984. See Telephone Interview with Norris Austin (Mar.
24, 2000). A recent newspaper article indicates that the road was constructed in 1984. See
Chris Kidder, The Good Life Has Come to Corolla, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE
LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Aug. 1, 1998, at 28.
30. In fact, the owners of the intervening land between the Currituck county line and
Corolla tried to cut off all access, without their permission, by attempting to block the use
of the two "roads" that became the subject of the litigation in West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33,
326 S.E.2d 601 (1985). When the residents of Corolla and Duck sued to keep the two
"roads" open, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a public right to use the
"roads" could be predicated on the existence of a public prescriptive easement. See id. at
62, 326 S.E.2d at 618.
31. See Quillin, supra note 3, at lA.
32 See id. at IA. In their complaint, the Whalehead plaintiffs allege:
In 1972, and for several years thereafter, Whalehead Club ... and the
surrounding outer banks area of Currituck County to the Virginia line, virtually
was [sic] unimproved and in a natural state. Access to the area was via the beach
at low tide by four-wheel drive vehicle traveling South from the Virginia border
or traveling by water to Corolla.
Complaint at 6, Giampa v. Currituck County (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19, 1998) (No. 98
CvS 153).
To protect their claim to the dry sand beach, the plaintiffs limited this statement of
fact to vehicles traveling the beach at low-tide, which implies that people only used the wet
sand beach (the area between high- and low-tide) for such purposes. Local historian,
Norris Austin, however, states that people and motor vehicles had traversed both the dry
and wet sand beach as a matter of course for a long time. See Telephone Interview with
Norris Austin, supra note 29. Furthermore, the testimony in West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33,
326 S.E.2d 601 (1985), established that people came from the south to Corolla along the
beach and the two makeshift roads at issue in West. See id at 38, 41-45, 51-53, 58-60, 326
S.E.2d at 601, 606-08, 611-12, 615-16; see also supra notes 26-27 (discussing West).
33. See, Quillin, supra note 3, at lA.
34. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements
of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 719, 755-97 (1996) (describing the history of the beach access movement in
1876 [Vol. 78
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privacy with them to North Carolina. The customs and traditions of
North Carolina, however, are not necessarily those of New Jersey,
Virginia, or Massachusetts. Although public recreational use of the
dry sand beaches came later in the history of North Carolina and was
probably more prevalent on the southern barrier island beaches,
which experienced earlier and more intense development,35 the
custom of the dry sand beaches being open to public trust uses has a
long history in North Carolina?6
The conflict between the Whalehead oceanfront property owners
and the public came to a head in the mid-1990s when large numbers
of people discovered the northern Currituck Banks area and began
Connecticut and New Jersey).
35. See Concerned Citizens v. Holden Beach Enter., 329 N.C. 37, 38-53, 404 S.E.2d
677, 679-87 (1991) (illustrating the general attitudes about the use of the dry sand beach).
The issue in Concerned Citizens was whether a public prescriptive easement existed across
the defendant's privately-owned uplands. The claimed easement provided access to the
southern end of Holden Beach. According to the court, "[tihe area in question is
privately-owned but over the years has been crossed by the public seeking access to the
ocean strand and inlet for fishing and recreation." Id. at 39, 404 S.E.2d at 679 (emphasis
added). Later in the case, the court stated that "[t]he 'purpose and nature' of the
easement [claimed] here was to reach the inlet and seashore for fishing, bathing, and other
recreational use." lI& at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 687. Neither the defendant nor the court
questioned the right of the public to use the ocean strand or inlet area. At issue was only
the crossing of the defendant's uplands to get to those areas. See id. at 38-40, 404 S.E.2d
at 679; see also Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 286-87, 171 S.E. 82, 82-83 (1933)
(illustrating the use of the ocean beach for motor vehicle travel). For a photograph of a
typical North Carolina beach scene, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 239. As far as
the camera can see, the dry sand beach is filled with people enjoying the seashore. See id.
Not all the southern barrier islands were easily accessible from the mainland and
traversed by public roads. For example, Bogue Banks, the location of Atlantic Beach, was
virtually undeveloped until the 1950s. At the eastern end is the site of the pre-Civil War
fort, Fort Macon. A large portion of the remainder of Bogue Banks was owned by two
individuals, with a number of bankers squatting in what is now Salter Path. Until the
1960s the only bridge to Bogue Banks was at the east end, crossing from Morehead City
on the mainland to Atlantic Beach on the banks. See iL at 211-15.
This does not mean that the general public and the southern barrier island owners
of coastal property lived in harmony. However, when efforts were made to exclude the
public from the dry sand beaches, owners did not claim that the public lacked the right to
use the beaches, but rather that they deprived the public of parking areas and access
across the dunes to reach the beach. For example, in Emerald Isle, also on Bogue Banks:
The [Bogue] inlet area for years has been used by fishermen, shell collectors, and
picnickers. In the 1970s the property along the road was posted and a barrier was
placed at the end of the road, with a sign reading "Towing Laws Enforced." The
town council voted three to two to restrict access to the inlet and turned down an
offer by the state to fund a beach access plan for the area. (The owner of the
house nearest the inlet is an influential member of the General Assembly.)
Id. at 214.
36. For example, a typical early public trust use of the dry sand was in connection with
commercial beach-seine fishing, a practice in which nets are dragged from the ocean onto
the dry sand beach. See Peele v. Morton, 396 F. Supp. 584, 585-86 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
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visiting the vicinity of Whalehead. When these people arrived, they
found beach access points, established pursuant to the North Carolina
Coastal Management Act ("CAMA"),37 every few blocks from the
nearby ocean road to the dry sand beach38 and convenient public
parking areas.3 9 The combination of a state road, new hotels and
motels, public parking near the beach, and CAMA beach access
points encouraged a massive influx of visitors parking in the parking
lots, walking to the beach, spreading out their blankets and volleyball
nets, and frolicking in the water.4 °
The Whalehead property owners neither liked nor intended to
tolerate this sudden invasion of their previously secluded refuge. So,
in June 1998, a group of oceanfront property owners4" filed the
Whalehead lawsuit. This lawsuit represents more than a legal dispute;
it is a culture clash, with elements of a class conflict. The core issues
in the lawsuit are whether title to oceanfront property includes
ownership of the dry sand beach and, if it does, whether the public
may therefore be excluded from privately-owned dry sand beaches.
These are issues that go beyond the Whalehead development and
affect the use of all dry sand beaches in the state.
37. Under the North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act ("CAMA"), N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 113A-100 to 113A-134.4, the North Carolina Coastal Commission acquires,
improves, and maintains a system of public access to coastal beaches and public trust
waters. See id. § 113A-134.3. These public access locations are referred to as CAMA
beach access locations or points and are usually designated by the placement of signs with
the colorful CAMA logo.
38. See Complaint at 17, Giampa v. Currituck County (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19,
1998) (No. 98 CvS 153). The CAMA beach access routes are located on narrow strips of
land that extend from the nearest street running parallel to the beach to the beach itself.
These rectangular strips are simply labeled as being ten feet in width on the original
Whalehead plat. The easements appear at regular intervals and run from Lighthouse
Drive to the oceanfront. Apparently, the plat makes no indication of the public or private
nature of the rectangular areas. See id.
39. CAMA signs are at the entrance to each of these access points, and parking areas
near the beach, created by the original developer and deeded to the county, are identified
by signs as public parking lots. See id. at 16-17. Paragraph 79 of the Whalehead
Complaint states that lots were first referred to as "public parking lots" in the summer of
1995. See id. Similarly, the plaintiffs alleged that it was not until 1995 that the county first
claimed that beach access ramps and walkways, constructed by the county and state in the
Whalehead development, were in fact public access ramps and walkways. See id. at 18.
40. According to a 1998 newspaper article, "[o]n any given summer Sunday, officials
say, Currituck beaches are carpeted with the towels of 20,000 visitors, most of whom are
renting houses or hotel rooms nearby. At Whalehead, five public parking lots are full and
people spread all over the wide beach." Quillin, supra note 3, at 1A.
41. Some non-oceanfront property owners are also plaintiffs in the lawsuit. See
Complaint at 10, Giampa v. Currituck County, (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19, 1998) (No.
98 CvS 153). Their claims against the state, however, have been dismissed. See Giampa,
No. 98 CvS 153 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) (Order on Motion to Dismiss).
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II. THE LOCATION OF THE SEAWARD BOUNDARY OF OCEANFRONT
PROPERTY
The traditional common law rule is that the seaward boundary of
oceanfront property is the mean high-water mark.42 As early as 1817,
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the common law rule
was part of the property law of this state.43 In 1978, this common law
rule was codified in section 77-20(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes, which provides that the "seaward boundary of all property
within the State of North Carolina ... which adjoins the ocean, is the
mean high water mark."'  Therefore, there can be no legitimate
question as to whether the mean high-water mark is the customary
seaward boundary for titles to oceanfront property. The critical issue,
then, is how to determine the mean high-water mark.
Neither statutes nor state court decisions articulate a precise
method for determining the mean high-water mark.' The location of
the mean high-water mark could be viewed as coinciding with certain
natural, visible indicators of the separation of the dry sand beach
from the adjacent uplands4 6 The vegetation line, usually found at the
42. The mean high-water mark is also frequently referred to as the "mean high-tide
line." In fact, in a January 12,2000 letter from Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen
Jernigan to the Coastal Resources Commission, "mean high tide line," "normal high
water," and "mean high water" are all used synonymously. See Memorandum from J.
Allen Jernigan, Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina, Department of
Justice, to the Coastal Resources Commission 1-4 (Jan. 12, 2000) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
In a few states, referred to as "low-tide states," the dividing of the seaward
boundary is the mean low-water mark, also referred to as the "mean low-tide line." See,
e.g., SLADE, supra note 4, at 59.
43. See McKenzie v. Hulet, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 613, 614 (1817). In Hulet, the court said:
"[w]here a grant abuts upon the sea ..., it stops, according to the common law, at the
ordinary high water mark; and the shore, that is, the ground between the high and low
water marks, belong of common right to the king." Id.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(a) (1999).
45. According to the trial judge, Superior Court Judge Jerry R. Tillett, Whalehead is a
case of first impression: "'The state's position is going to be that you locate the high-
water mark by a number of indicia .... The plaintiff, on the other hand, will argue that
you use different indicia.'" Hart Matthews, Ruling May Turn The Tide In Lawsuit: Judge
To Decide Where Public Beach Ends And Private Property Begins, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
& LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), May 16, 1999, at Y1 (stating, as an example, that "[t]he
state might say ... that the mean high-water line should be measured by the line of
erosion, which would push private property owners back to the base of the first dune").
46. In the Whalehead litigation, the state argued that "under North Carolina law,
'mean high water,' or 'mean high tide' on the ocean beach is determined by reference to
the location of the vegetation or dune line." Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings at 7, Giampa v. Currituck County, (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June
19, 1998) (No. 98 CvS 153); see also id. at 9-13 (arguing that the Borax rule is not the law
of North Carolina and that North Carolina courts have accepted the use of "physical
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foot of the first stable dunes,47 or other natural indicators, such as the
line of water debris, shows the maximum ordinary reach of tidal
waters. Because the vegetation line and other natural indicators
define the mean high-water mark for some regulatory purposes,48
they arguably could define it for title purposes as well.
49
The problems with this methodology are twofold. First, in
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier v. Town of Carolina Beach,50 the court
said that the "high-water mark is generally computed as a mean or
average high-tide, and not the extreme height of the water. '51
Because salt water generally kills shore vegetation, the vegetation or
dune line lies above the reach of all but the highest tides in a tide
cycle. Therefore, the vegetation line cannot represent a true mean
high-water mark-an average of all daily tides. Similarly, the line of
debris shows the maximum reach of wave-driven ocean waters. 3 In
references, such as vegetation, to locate the 'mean high tide' "). This Memorandum
suggests that the vegetation line may be the legal and functional equivalent of the mean
high-water mark. A January 2000 letter to the Coastal Resources Commission from
Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jernigan makes the same suggestion:
Under North Carolina law, the State holds title to lands flowed by the waters of
the Atlantic Ocean up to the mean high tide line .... The CRC [Coastal
Resources Commission] has also codified the practice of establishing the location
of the mean or average high tide line for permitting purposes by reference to the
vegetation line and other indicators of high water. CAMA rules define "normal
high water" to be "the ordinary extent of high tide based on site conditions such
as presence or location of vegetation, which has its distribution influenced by
tidal action, and the location of the apparent high tide line .... In North
Carolina, public rights of use have traditionally been extended to the entire
beach strand seaward of the dune or vegetation line.
Jernigan Memorandum, supra note 42, at 2-3 (bold in the original; italics added).
47. See N.C. ADMIn. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.305(e) (June 1999). In areas where there is
no stable natural vegetation present, the line may nonetheless be determined by either
extrapolation or extension of the line of the nearest adjacent vegetation. See id.
4& See Webb v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health, and Natural Resources, 102
N.C. App. 767, 771-72, 404 S.E.2d 29, 32 (1991); see also supra note 46 (holding that for
purposes of a CAMA permit, the line of vegetation may be used to determine the location
of the normal high water.).
49. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 7, 9-13,
Giampa v. Currituck County, (N.C. Super. Ct. filed June 19, 1998) (No. 98 CvS 153); see
also Jernigan Memorandum, supra note 42 (discussing the January 2000 letter from
Special Deputy Attorney General J. Allen Jernigan to the Coastal Resources
Commission).
50. 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
51. Id. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516.
52. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 6.03(a)(1), at 172.
53. In People v. William Kent Estate Company, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966), the
California Supreme Court observed that "the terms 'ordinary high tide' and 'mean high
tide,' as used in cases and statutes, refer to an average over a long period." Id. at 218
(emphasis added). The presence or absence of vegetation would be relevant only if the
boundary was the ordinary high-water mark. Scholars have noted the following:
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short, this methodology provides not a mean high-water mark, but
rather a maximum high-water mark.
Second, adopting the vegetation or dune line as the dividing line
between privately-owned oceanfront property and state-owned public
trust lands would contravene the original purpose of section 77-20(a).
Section 77-20(a) appears to have been a response to the North
Carolina General Assembly's concern in 1978 that the North Carolina
Coastal Commission might attempt to make the vegetation line the
seaward boundary of privately-owned oceanfront property. In 1978,
the issue before the Commission was the establishment of the
oceanfront setback line for new construction.54 The Commission
spent several months debating this question, and, after considering
various alternatives, the Commission ultimately settled on a variable
setback based on erosion rates measured from the vegetation line.
Opponents of the original North Carolina Coastal Area Management
Act of 1974 and of oceanfront setback lines in particular took the
view that the Commission was trying to move the seaward boundary
line for oceanfront property owners from the mean high-water mark
to the vegetation line. Despite assurances that the Commission did
not intend the reference point to affect title, but only to determine a
seaward boundary line for new construction, the General Assembly
passed section 77-20(a) to codify the existing and generally
understood common law rule.55 In fact, neither the state nor the
Commission opposed the legislation. Their position was that the dry
sand beach was subject to public trust use rights and that the use of
The ordinary high water mark is the usual boundary between the bed of
navigable watercourse and the adjacent upland. According to the weight of
authority, the ordinary high water mark is the line that water impresses upon the
soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy
its value for agriculture. Unlike the mean high water line ... the ordinary high
water mark does not represent the intersection of a particular vertical datum with
the shore. Instead it is a physical mark caused by the action of the water on the
land, and refers to a point at which the character of the soil and vegetation, if
any, differs from that of the upland.
Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 184, 260-61 (1974)
(emphasis added).
54. See E-mail from David W. Owens, Associate Professor of Public Law and
Government and Assistant Director, Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, to Joseph J. Kalo 1 (Jan. 4,2000) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (detailing the background of section 77-20(a) of the North Carolina General
Statutes). Professor Owens was the Director of the Division of Coastal Management from
1984-89 and is recognized as an authority on the North Carolina Coastal Management
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the mean high-water mark as the seaward boundary did not affect
those pre-existing public trust rights 6 No one seriously contended
that the vegetation line was the seaward boundary dividing privately-
owned oceanfront property from state-owned public trust lands.
In 1991, in Webb v. North Carolina Department of Environment,
Health, and Natural Resources,57 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
sustained the Division of Coastal Management's practice of
determining "the approximate location of ... [the mean high-water
mark] based on the presence of natural indicators of high water and
observation of actual high tide rather than to rely on a survey of mean
high water."58 Webb, however, is not necessarily authoritative as to
the issue of whether the vegetation line is coterminous with the mean
high-water mark for the purpose of locating the seaward boundary of
oceanfront property.59 The land involved in Webb was located on
Banks Channel, not the Atlantic Ocean. The interpretation of section
77-20(a) was not before the court. The court held simply that it is
acceptable for the Division of Coastal Management to use natural
indicators of high-water for purposes of approximating the location of
the mean high-water mark for establishing a CAMA authorized
bulkhead line.' Webb, then, does not support using the vegetation
line to establish the section 77-20(a) mean high-water mark for
purposes of determining the seaward boundary of oceanfront
property.
Another methodology for locating the mean high-water mark
was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Borax
Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles.6 In Borax, in which the
seaward boundary of federal grants was at issue, the Court used the
average of the height of all tides over an 18.6-year period to
56. See iL
57. 102 N.C. App. 767,404 S.E.2d 29 (1991).
58. Id at 771-72,404 S.E.2d at 32.
59. Webb addressed a CAMA regulation requiring that a bulkhead alignment for
purposes of shoreline stabilization "shall approximate mean high water or normal water
level." N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0208(b)(7)(A) (June 1999) (emphasis added).
60. See Webb at 772, 404 S.E.2d at 32. The actual mean high-water mark could be
determined by a survey, see, e.g., Maloney & Ausness, supra note 53, at 245-61, but that is
an expensive, time-consuming procedure not necessary under the CAMA regulation,
which permits approximation. However:
[u]ntil recently ... determining the exact location of the mean high water line
was not considered important by the public and was consequently neglected by
the engineering and surveying professions .... Recent demands, however, for
coastal property have accentuated the need for more precise demarcation of
coastal boundaries.
Id at 245-46.
61. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
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determine the location of the mean high-water mark.62 The 18.6-year
period reflects the time it takes for the moon, the major tide-
producing force, to complete a cycle during which its distance from
the earth and sun varies.6' According to the Borax rule, the mean
high-water line along a beach is where a plane of a certain elevation,
determined by the mean height of the tides over an 18.6 year cycle,
intersects the contours of a particular beach.' 4
While the North Carolina Supreme Court has never expressly
adopted the Borax 18.6-year rule as the law of North Carolina, it
arguably has endorsed this rule.65 In Carolina Beach, the court noted
that "the high-water mark is generally computed as the mean or
average high-tide, and not as the extreme height of the water. ' 66 In
addition to referencing Borax itself, the court also referenced People
v. William Kent Estate Co.,67 a California case applying the Borax
18.6-year rule.' The implication, then, is that the court approved of
the Borax rule. But, even assuming that the Court did not adopt the
Borax rule, Carolina Beach makes clear that a mean high-water mark
is an average of the heights of tidal waters over some period of time-
not a line, such as the vegetation line, determined by the height of the
highest tides. Therefore, under normal circumstances, title to
oceanfront property includes all or some portion of the adjacent dry
sand beach.
62. See id. at 27.
63. See, e.g., GEORGE M. COLE, WATER BOUNDARIEs 7-9 (1997). For the methods
used to determine the mean high-tide line, see id. at 15-55; Maloney & Ausness, supra
note 53, at 246-61. Tides are the product of the gravitational forces of the moon and sun
and the centrifugal force created by the earth's spin. As the moon orbits the earth and the
earth orbits the sun, the distance of the earth from the moon and the sun will vary and the
relationship of the moon to the sun will change. The variations in these distances and
relationships affect the strength of the gravitational forces pulling on the fluid water,
which in turn affects the height of the tides created. It takes approximately 18.6 years
(usually rounded off to the whole year for purposes of calculation) to complete this cycle,
or tidal epoch. See, e.g., COLE, supra, at 7-17.
64. See Maloney & Ausness, supra note 53, at 245-52.
65. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
303,177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970).
66. IL at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516 (citing Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); People v. William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Cal.
App. 1906)).
67. 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966).
68. See icL at 218.
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III. ACCRETION, EROSION, AVULSION, AND SEAWARD
BOUNDARIES
Because one of the most valuable and significant aspects of
oceanfront property is its contact with, and access to, ocean waters,
thp right to maintain contact with the ocean has long been recognized
as a significant legal right attendant to the ownership of oceanfront
property. 9 As a result, the common law rule is that if sand is
gradually added to the beach by accretion, and the mean high-water
mark moves seaward, the accretion belongs to the oceanfront
property owner.7 ° On the other hand, if sand is slowly eroded away
by natural forces, the oceanfront property owner loses land.71 The
rules of accretion and erosion, then, simply reflect the larger right to
maintain contact with ocean waters as the shoreline moves through
natural cycles and processes. Thus, the mean high-water mark is not
a fixed boundary line, but rather an ambulatory one, moving as forces
of nature alter the contours of the beach. These common law rules
have long been part of the law of North Carolina.2
While the common law rules of erosion and accretion are part of
an overall policy of protecting the oceanfront property owner's
contact with and access to ocean waters, the same cannot be said for
the common law rule of avulsion. Avulsive changes are those sudden,
frequently dramatic, shoreline changes occasioned by the hammering
of the shoreline by hurricane or northeaster winds and waves. Where
such sudden, powerful, natural forces cause a sudden and perceptible
change in the contours of the shoreline, the common law rule is that
the seaward boundary of oceanfront property remains unaffected and
therefore does not move.73 If, after the storm, fifty feet of dry sand
beach disappears and the waves pound the dune line, the boundary
line is the point where the mean high-water mark met the beach
69. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 6.01(a)(1), at 90.
70. See id § 6.03(b)(2), at 187-95.
71. See id
72. As early as 1820, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the traditional
rule that an owner's property boundary line shifts with the gradual movement of the water
boundary. See Murry v. Sermon, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 56, 56-57 (1820) (addressing whether
the state or the private waterfront property owners had title to the increase of shoreline
soil resulting from the gradual recession of the waters of Mattamuskeet Lake); see also
State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 146,179 S.E. 2d 371,384 (1971) (involving movement of an
inlet); Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 304, 177
S.E.2d 513, 517 (1970) (involving beach erosion); Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v.
Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 228, 517 S.E.2d 406, 414-15 (1999) (involving beach
erosion).
73. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 6.03(b)(2), at 191; Johnson,
278 N.C. at 146, 179 S.E.2d at 384.
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before the avulsive event. The oceanfront property owner retains
title to the newly submerged lands lying between the present and pre-
storm mean high-water marks. If, after the storm, fifty feet of dry
sand has been added to the beach, the oceanfront property owner's
seaward boundary is calculated according to the mean high-water
mark before the storm.74
The common law rule governing the effect of avulsive events
makes little sense in the context of oceanfront property. This rule is
inconsistent with the general policy of protecting a littoral owner's
right of access to the waterbody and creates unnecessary confusion
and uncertainty in the larger body of law governing public and private
rights in coastal lands and ocean waters. The consequences of
avulsive events for boundary lines should be no different than those
of the natural processes of erosion and accretion.
The common law rule of avulsion is part of the law of North
Carolina.75 With respect to oceanfront property, however, section 77-
20(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes can and should be read
as rejecting that rule as a matter of statutory language, common
sense, and sound policy. Section 77-20(a) states in plain language that
"the seaward boundary" of all oceanfront property "is the mean high
water mark. '76 An appropriate reading of the statute would appear to
be that the mean high-water mark remains the seaward boundary
irrespective of changes in the contours of the shoreline and regardless
of whether the changes are the product of the processes of erosion
and accretion or the result of avulsion. This reading is reinforced by
section 146-6(a), which provides that, "[i]f any land is, by any process
of nature.., raised above the high watermark of any navigable water,
title thereto shall vest in the owner of that land which, immediately
prior to the raising of the land in question, directly adjoined the
navigable water.177 Including the phrase "by any process of nature"
clearly changes the common law avulsion rule governing additions to
the shoreline. Section 146-6(a) does not, however, address the effect
on legal title when natural forces create submerged lands where once
there were uplands. If the natural forces qualify as erosion, then the
common law rule places title to such submerged land in the state.
But, whether title to submerged lands resulting from an avulsive
event lies with the state or remains with the littoral owner would still
74. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 6.03(b)(2), at 191.
75. See Johnson, 278 N.C. at 146, 179 S.E.2d at 384; Murry, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) at 57;
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(a) (1999) (emphasis added); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 146-64(4), (7) (1999) (including the waters of the Atlantic Ocean as navigable waters).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1999) (emphasis added).
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depend on whether section 77-20(a) is construed to reject the
traditional common law rule of avulsion. 8
In addition to the explicit language of section 77-20(a), common
sense and sound policy require that it be read as a complete rejection
of the common law rule of avulsion. Application of the avulsion rule
would mean that when there is a sudden and perceptible increase of
the dry sand beach, the resulting addition to the shoreline would not
belong to the littoral owner. Instead, if the boundary between the
private uplands and state-owned public trust lands does not move as
the result of an avulsive addition to the shoreline, the addition would
belong to the state and be part of the state's public trust lands. This
would destroy the littoral owner's direct contact with the ocean. Such
a result certainly would be inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of oceanfront owners that, regardless of the cause, they
hold title to any shoreline additions and that such additions simply
extend their littoral property seaward.
The application of the common law avulsion rule would also
create unnecessary confusion and uncertainty in the law governing
public and private rights in coastal lands and waters. If a hurricane
removes a large segment of the dry sand beach and the boundary
does not move, the oceanfront owner would hold title to the resulting
wet sand beach. Does that mean the public could not legally walk on
that wet sand beach? If this were the case, it would mean that there
would be segments of the wet sand beach over which the public would
have no rights of use. The uncertain and fortuitous movement of
sand in summer hurricanes and winter northeasters would create a
quilted beach: in some areas, the public would have the right of
passage and use of the area below the mean high-tide line; in other
adjacent areas, the public would not. Such a result is totally
inconsistent with the notion that the public trust, at a minimum,
creates an unbroken stretch of wet sand beach extending the length of
the state's shoreline that is submerged public trust land available for
use by the public.7 9
78. There is a provision in title 146, section 64(6) of the North Carolina General
Statutes which defines "State Lands" as including "submerged lands," but that section
limits the inclusion of submerged lands as state lands to those in which title is vested in the
state. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1999).
79. In People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 143 N.Y.S. 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1913), modified
on other grounds, 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916), the only case to address directly the effect of
the shoreline's receding following an avulsive event on the public's right of passage over
the foreshore, the court held that the public retained the same right of passage over the
new foreshore as it had over the old. See id. at 509. In other words, the littoral owner may
own the foreshore and adjacent submerged lands, but the littoral owner's title to such
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Therefore, natural changes in the contours of the shoreline may
change the point at which the mean high-water mark intersects the
beach, but will not change the legal reference point for determining
the seaward boundary for oceanfront property. It is and remains the
mean high-water mark, wherever it is then located. This is not
necessarily true when the shoreline change results from the filling of
submerged lands and the raising of such lands above the mean high-
water mark, an activity that is becoming increasingly common as
more beaches are nourished.
IV. BEACH NOURiSHMENT AND OWNERSHIP OF THE DRY SAND
BEACH
Following the devastating hurricanes of recent years, there has
been a significant receding of large segments of the beaches of the
North Carolina barrier islands.80 The United States Army Corps of
Engineers estimates that sixty miles of ocean beach is in need of
nourishment.8 1 The sand loss is believed to have averaged 100 cubic
yards per foot of beach, or a staggering total of 31.7 million cubic
areas is burdened by public trust rights. The result in Steeplechase Park illustrates that the
avulsion rule does not accord with common expectations, both public and private, about
rights of use of the foreshore and public trust submerged lands. A better, more direct
approach would do away with the distinction between the effect of avulsive changes and
changes brought about by erosion and accretion.
There does not appear to be any real historical or other justification for the
separate rules governing accretion and avulsion. Perhaps the distinction reflects a belief
that a littoral owner could take steps to protect littoral land from the effects of erosion by
bulkheading or constructing seawalls but that there was little one could do to protect
littoral lands from the effects of hurricanes, northeasters, or other strong storms. Because
current coastal development regulations severely limit the construction of bulkheads,
seawalls, or other beach hardening structures and devices, such a justification is no longer
persuasive.
Another possible justification might have to do with the right of the littoral owner
to recover lands lost as the result of a hurricane or other storm. If the littoral owner
retains title to lands submerged as the result of an avulsive event, then as a legal matter
the littoral owner should be able to recover those lands, fill them, and raise them above
the mean high-tide line. Whatever validity such a justification may have had in the past, it
too has little force today. The right of littoral owners to recover land lost to storms is
governed by statutes which draw no distinction between land lost due to erosion and land
lost due to avulsion. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(b)-(c) (1999). Title to land lost to an
owner by "natural causes" and raised above the mean high-tide line vests in the owner of
those previously lost lands unless the raising of the lands was part of a publicly financed
project involving hydraulic dredging or other deposition of spoil materials or sand. Since
no justification exists for the common law rule of avulsion, the courts should not hesitate
in concluding that section 77-20(a) abrogates that common law rule.
80. See Jerry Allegood, Seaside Towns Need Sand, Money, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 10, 1999, at IA.
81. See id.
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yards of sand.82 The projected cost of such a vast nourishment project
exceeds $76 million." Although the tremendous cost of such
nourishment and other competing needs make it doubtful that
Congress and the State will be both willing and able to fund all the
recommended nourishment activities, undoubtedly we will see more
nourishment projects undertaken on the barrier island beaches in the
near future.' Whatever the outcome of the Whalehead case as to the
extent of the rights of oceanfront property owners to the natural dry
sand beach, any such rights may be extinguished by nourishment
projects. The law is clear: publicly-financed replenished beaches are
public beaches.85
For purposes of the present discussion, Corps beach nourishment
projects can be divided into two categories. The first category
includes projects undertaken to reestablish a beach seriously eroded
as the result of natural forces and conditions. 6 The second category
consists of mitigation projects-those undertaken to correct and
mitigate erosion damage to shorelines resulting from a Corps
navigation project, such as the construction of jetties to protect an
inlet.87 In both types of projects, public funds are used, but in the
82. See iL
83. See id.
84. North Carolina has already seen a number of beach nourishment projects.
Beaches on Hatteras Island have been nourished six times since 1974 at a total cost of $1.4
million; Cape Hatteras beaches have been nourished three times since 1966 at a total cost
of $4 million; beaches on Ocracoke have been nourished five times since 1986 at a total
cost of $2.2 million; beaches at Atlantic Beach have been nourished five times since 1978
at a total cost of $12.7 million; beaches on Topsail Island have been nourished five times
since 1982 at a total cost of $1.1 million; Wrightsville Beach beaches have been nourished
eighty times since 1955 at a total cost of $8.6 million; Carolina Beach beaches have been
nourished twenty-six times since 1955 at a total cost of $20.5 million; and Long Beach
beaches have been nourished three times since 1992 at a total cost of $1.6 million. See
Tinker Ready, The Cost of Saving the Shoreline, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Aug. 30, 1997, at 1A. Kure Beach was the object of a $14.2 million project completed in
1998. Nourishing Beaches is Worth the Investment, Officials Hear, DAILY NEWS
(Jacksonville, N.C.), Jan. 22,2000, at 1A.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (1999).
86. A critical public policy issue is determining who pays the costs of a beach
nourishment project. How the costs of a particular project are shared by the federal
government and the local interest, which is the municipality, county, or state entity
responsible for the project, depends upon the type of project and may vary substantially.
Determining the appropriate allocation of costs between the federal government and the
non-federal interest is not for the faint hearted, rather a number of statutes and complex
regulations need to be examined. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BEACH
NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION 44 (1995).
87. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 426i (Supp. 2000); see also supra note 86 (discussing the
allocation of costs between the federal and non-federal interest). Typically, in such cases,
the Corps navigation project interferes with the natural movement of the sand in the
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second category, the federal government often will pay most, if not
all, of the costs of the project. 8
The distinction between these two types of projects is important
to the questions of ownership of the dry sand beach and public use of
a particular nourished beach. If the beach nourishment is part of a
hurricane and storm damage reduction project and the federal
government pays any of the costs of the project, then, under federal
law, the nourished beach must be open to the public.8 9 Federal funds
may not be spent on nourishment of non-public beaches;90 rather, any
such costs must be borne by the state or local government or by
private individuals. To implement the congressional mandate that
non-federal funds cover the costs of benefits to privately-owned
shores, the Corps has adopted detailed regulations governing federal
participation in shore protection projects.91
Furthermore, although the federal policy is to provide federal
financial assistance in reducing damage to shore development and
coastal resources from erosion, hurricanes, and other natural
phenomena through shore protection projects, it is not the policy of
the federal government to participate in projects that primarily
provide recreational benefits. The recreational benefits associated
with a project must be purely incidental; the beaches being
replenished must be open to the public.92
The Corps regulations also specify the circumstances under
which a beach is deemed open to the public. The regulations require
that the beach be open to use by all persons on equal terms.93 This
means more than public access to the replenished beach. Lack of
sufficient parking facilities for the general public located reasonably
longshore currents. For example, a jetty will cut off the flow of sand in the longshore
currents downcurrent from the jetty, resulting in the beach becoming sand-starved and
eroding more rapidly than would otherwise be the case.
88. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 426i.
89. See UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REG. No. 1165-2-130,
WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN SHORE
PROTECTION 6h, at 12 (June 15, 1989) [hereinafter CORPS POLICIES AND
AUTHORrrIES].
90. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986, as amended in 1999, provides
that:
(B) BENEFITS TO PRIVATELY OWNED SHORES-All costs assigned to
benefits of periodic nourishment projects or measures to privately owned shores
(where use of such shores is limited to private interests) or to prevention of losses
of private land shall be borne by the non-Federal interest.
33 U.S.C.A. § 2213(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 2000).
91. See CORPS POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES, supra note 89, 6h, at 12-13.
92. See id. 6a, at 4-9; 6g, at 10; 6h, at 12-13.
93. See id I 6h, at 12.
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nearby or lack of reasonable public access from public roads or
parking areas to the beach constitutes a de facto restriction on public
use, precluding federal funding of the project.94 Reasonable public
access requires, at a minimum, that there be access points every
quarter of a mile to the beach project area.95 In order to satisfy these
federal requirements, the local state entity participating in the beach
nourishment project must obtain any and all easements or rights
necessary from private oceanfront property owners in the project
area to ensure that the beach will be open to use by the public.96
These federal requirements do not mandate public ownership of
the nourished beach-only that it be open to the public. North
Carolina law, however, emphatically states that where land is raised
above the mean high-water mark, which is what is done in a beach
nourishment project, title to the raised land vests in the state. Section
146-6(f) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that "the
title to land in or immediately along the Atlantic Ocean raised above
the mean high water mark by publicly financed projects which involve
hydraulic dredging or other deposition of spoil materials or sand vests
in the State."'
CAMA regulations applicable to beach nourishment projects go
even further in conditioning state involvement in beach nourishment
projects. The applicable regulations require that "[t]he entire
restored portion of the beach shall be in permanent public
ownership."9" Obtaining public ownership of the entire restored
94. See id. I 6h(2), at 13.
95. See idU 6h(3), at 13.
96. See id. 10-12, at 22-23. When a beach nourishment project is undertaken, a
project line is established. The project line will be located at some point above the
existing mean high-water mark because of the need to contour the beach through the
placement of sand during the project. Seaward of that line, sand will be placed on the
beach. The project line should be the new seaward boundary of the private oceanfront
property if the documents executed cede title to the state of all lands seaward of that
point. If the documents do not cede title, then the boundary line is the mean high-water
mark as it existed before the project was undertaken because, by statute, title vests in
filled land below the mean high-water mark in the state. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(0
(1999).
A potential problem for beach nourishment efforts is the holdout oceanfront
property owner. Most oceanfront property owners faced with a receding beach and the
potential for future storm damage would participate readily in any project that would
protect their investment, but there is always the occasional holdout. When friendly
persuasion and self-interest are insufficient to obtain the cooperation of an oceanfront
property owner, the local entity will have to purchase the required easement or rights.
This may entail using the power of eminent domain to condemn the relevant portion of
the oceanfront parcel and to acquire the necessary rights.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(0.
98. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7M.0202(d)(1) (June 1999) (emphasis added).
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portion of the beach requires that adjacent oceanfront property
owners affirmatively transfer all rights and interests in that area to the
state. Thus, as a result of past and future beach nourishment projects
necessitated by the erosion of beaches caused by hurricane winds and
waters, large segments of the North Carolina barrier island dry sand
beaches are and will be owned by the state and therefore open to
public use.
If, however, the beach nourishment is part of a federal corrective
and mitigation project, federal law does not require that the
nourished beach be open to use by the public.99 In this instance, the
Corps will place sand on privately-owned and controlled beaches.
However, section 146-6(f) draws no distinction between types of
mitigation projects. By its terms, if any public funds are used, then
that portion of the nourished beach extending seaward of the mean
high-water mark that existed prior to the nourishment is owned by
the state and available for use by the public."'
Some local governments, however, may only require oceanfront property owners to
execute documents that convey an easement to the local entity for public use of the
replenished beach. For example, one such document, entitled "Perpetual Easement For
Beach Renourishment," executed in connection with a beach nourishment project on the
beaches of the Town of Kure Beach, North Carolina, attempts to create a revocable
easement-revocable if the beach was not replenished on a regular, continuing basis. The
oceanfront property owner executing the document employed the following language:
This easement shall expire six years from the date the execution was
acknowledged before a Notary Public unless the grantee or its successors and
assigns have engaged in the deposit of sand on the easement as part of the above-
referenced "Carolina Beach and Vicinity-Area South, Hurricane, Wave, and
Shore Protection Project" and shall expire automatically if there is any six year
period in which sand is not deposited as part of this project or a comparable
project sponsored in whole or in part by the Town of Kure Beach.
Perpetual Easement For Beach Renourishment, New Hanover County, North Carolina,
December 30,1995 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Such easements, however broad or limited, are inconsistent with the clear
directive of section 146-6(f) and the applicable CAMA regulation that title to replenished
beaches is in the state which holds them as public trust lands. Failure to make this clear to
oceanfront property owners only causes confusion as to the extent of public rights to the
beach and may be the source of unnecessary future litigation.
99. The federal policy mandating public use of beaches created as part of a federal
beach erosion control project is explained in Chapter 14 of United States Army Corps of
Engineers, Digest of Water Resources Policies and Authorities, Engineer Pamphlet 11-65-
2-1, 14-1 to 14-11 (July 30, 1999). The authorizing legislation does not permit federal
funds to be expended to nourish shores where use is limited to private interests. See id-
14-1(c)(2)(a), at 14-4. A federal corrective and mitigation project is funded under
different authorities and for a different purpose. Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 2213(d)(2)(B)
(Supp. 2000) (periodic nourishment) with 33 U.S.C.A. § 426i (Supp. 2000) (shore damage
prevention or mitigation).
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (1999).
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Such an interpretation of the statute may result in a taking of
private property for which compensation is mandated by both the
federal and state constitutions. If erosion is caused by artificially
created conditions, the oceanfront property owner has a common law
claim for damages against the responsible party.'' Although the
federal navigation servitude protects the federal government from
some liability resulting from its navigation projects, under existing
case law, the federal government arguably is liable for increased
beach erosion caused by federal navigation structures.102 Thus, the
federal mitigation project is a form of compensation to the affected
oceanfront property owner. If the state takes title to the raised land
under section 146-6(f), then the state arguably is appropriating a
benefit that rightly belongs to the oceanfront property owner. In such
circumstances, the state must either permit title to the nourished dry
sand beach to remain in the adjacent oceanfront property owner or
compensate that owner.10 Therefore, unless the beach nourishment
project is a federal corrective mitigation project, a nourished beach is
a public beach. If the project is corrective, then title should vest in
the oceanfront owner. The public right to use the private property
depends on whether the Whalehead litigation results in a decision that
all dry sand beaches of the state are public beaches.
V. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS To THE DRY SAND BEACH
Applying the Borax 18.6-year rule or some other similar
methodology to determine the mean high-water mark renders the
Whalehead plaintiffs' argument that they hold legal title to the dry
sand beach hard to dispute because that title has not been affected by
101. See, e.g., Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Mass. 1982) (upholding a claim
for shoreline damage caused by a neighboring stone groin on the theory that the
appropriateness of the use of shoreline protection measures depends on whether it is a
"reasonable use" by the owner of the groin) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 805A (1977)).
102. In Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406 (1996), the United States Court of
Federal Claims held that oceanfront property owners who alleged in their complaint that
federal navigation structures interfered with the natural movement of sand in the adjacent
ocean littoral currents, thereby increasing the rate of erosion on their oceanfront property,
stated a legally cognizable claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. at 413-16.
103. If the plaintiffs have the right to recover land lost to them by natural causes, which
they do, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(a) (1999), and the federal government is liable for
the loss of the land by reason of the action of federal navigation structures, then title to the
sand on the beach should be in the oceanfront property owner. If the state claims title to
the raised land, then the state is physically taking land belonging to the oceanfront
property owner in violation of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 19 of the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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any movement of the shoreline by any natural forces. Nevertheless,
the location of the mean high-water mark and the possession of
technical legal title in private hands may not be determinative of the
existence or non-existence of the public's right to use the dry sand
beach." 4 The issue of the.public right to use the dry sand beach is
separate from the matter of ownership.
Under theories recognized in some other jurisdictions, privately-
owned, dry sand beaches may be burdened by the right of the public
to use the dry sand beach for uses associated with the use of public
trust waters and submerged lands. 05 Those theories recognizing the
broadest rights of the public to use privately-owned, dry sand beaches
are the doctrine of custom"° and the expanded public trust doctrine
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105-17. In addition, the mean high-water mark
is not a very practical dividing line between lands subject to public trust rights and lands
not subject to public trust rights. In particular, the mean high-water mark is not a visible
line. At different times the land between the mean high-water mark and the ocean waters
will appear to be part of the dry sand beach, to be part of the wet sand, or to be covered
entirely by ocean waters. Thus, where it exists, the vegetation line serves as a more visible
dividing line between beach which is purely private and beach which is subject to public
use.
105. These theories are explored in some depth in Alice Gibbon Carmichael,
Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to North Carolina Beaches,
64 N.C. L. REv. 159, 174-75 (1985); see also JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND 6.02-6.03 (rev. ed. 1995) (discussing
various theories supporting claims that dry sand beaches are open to public use). Of these
various theories, only the doctrines of custom and expanded public trust are applicable to
support claims that all dry sand beaches are open to the public. The other theories-
public prescriptive easements and implied dedication-are applied on a case-by-case basis
to particular locations. See, e.g., BRUCE & ELY, supra, 4.0614], at 4-82 to 4-84, 5.09[3],
at 5-51 to 5-55. Successful litigation results only in a finding that an easement was
established over a particular tract of land or that a particular tract was dedicated to the
public use. See id.
106. The Oregon Supreme Court was the first court to apply the common law doctrine
of custom to establish the public's right to use the dry sand beaches of a state. See State ex
rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969). The essential elements of a claim of
customary use are: (1) a long and general usage, which in the case of beach access the
Oregon court traced back to the use by the Native Americans prior to the arrival of
European settlers; (2) without interruption by oceanfront property owners; (3) peaceful
and free of dispute; (4) reasonable; (5) certain as to its scope and character; (6) without
objection by landowners; and (7) not contrary to other customs or laws of the state. See id.
at 677-78; see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 454-55 (Or. 1993)
(restating the doctrine of custom articulated in Thornton). A few other jurisdictions have
also applied the doctrine of custom to uphold the public right to use dry sand beaches. See
United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (D.V.I. 1974);
Public Access Shoreline v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1255-56
(Haw. 1995); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (Haw. 1973); Arrington v.
Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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first set forth in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,107 a
New Jersey case.
In the few states which have recognized the doctrine of custom,108
long and uninterrupted past use by the public of the dry sand may
create a legally-protected right to continue such use."09 It is not clear
that the doctrine of custom is part of the common law of North
Carolina as no North Carolina court yet has applied the doctrine to
the acquisition of property rights.110 But, assuming it is, the state
faces one major evidentiary hurdle: the state may have to show that
since the earliest colonial times, if not before, a custom existed that
the dry sand beaches were regarded as open to general public use."'
Whether sufficient historical evidence can be produced is unclear.
The second theory recognizing the right of the public to use the
dry sand beaches is the expanded public trust doctrine. The doctrine
provides that "the public must be given both access to and use of
privately-owned dry sand areas as are reasonably necessary ... [and]
must be afforded reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a
suitable area for recreation on the dry sand."'1 Whether the public
trust doctrine would be interpreted as broadly by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is an open question. Perhaps a clue to the court's
thinking can be found in its rebuke of the North Carolina Court of
107. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
108. See supra note 106.
109. See Hay, 462 P.2d at 677-78. The doctrine of custom would allow proof of a state-
wide custom, and an affirmative decision would establish the existence of a state-wide
right of the public to use dry sand beaches. See id. at 676.
110. See Carmichael, supra note 105, at 174-75 (asserting that it is unlikely that the
North Carolina courts would accept the doctrine of custom as part of the law of the state);
see also Winder v. Blake, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 332, 336 (1857) (implying that the doctrine of
custom cannot affect common law rights). But see Bost v. Mingues, 64 N.C. 44, 46-47
(1870) (recognizing custom of county to allow livestock to run at large). Furthermore,
there is a serious issue as to whether the application of the doctrine of custom to establish
public rights in privately-owned dry sand beaches is a violation of the taking clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
854 F.2d 449 (Or. 1993), the Supreme Court of Oregon reaffirmed the doctrine of custom.
See id. at 452-57. When the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari, however, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented on the ground
that a serious taking question was presented by the petition. See Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207,1207-14 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. The North Carolina General Assembly believes that such a customary right exists.
See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. In State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d
671 (Or. 1969), the evidence showed that when the first European settlers arrived on the
shores of what is now the state of Oregon, native Americans were using the dry sand
beaches and that the European settlers continued this practice. See id. at 673.
112. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355,365-66 (N.J. 1984).
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Appeals in Concerned Citizens v. Holden Beach Enterprises. 3  In
Concerned Citizens, the Court of Appeals was unpersuaded "that [it]
should extend the public trust doctrine to deprive individual property
owners of some portion of their property rights without
compensation.""' 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court pointedly and
specifically responded by saying:
We note dicta in the Court of Appeals opinion to the effect
that the public trust doctrine will not secure public access to
a public beach across the land of a private property owner
... [but] it [is not] clear that in its unqualified form the
statement reflects the law of this state, [and] we expressly
disavow this comment."5
The Supreme Court's response therefore suggests that the Matthews
expanded public trust doctrine may be part of the common law of
North Carolina.
In 1998, recognizing that section 77-20(a) might be misread as a
legislative statement about public trust uses of privately-owned dry
sand beaches and a rejection of the doctrine of custom or the
expanded public trust doctrine, the legislature amended section 77-20
by adding subsections (d) and (e). Subsection (d) states that
The public having made frequent, uninterrupted, and
unobstructed use of the full width and breadth of the ocean
beaches of this State from time immemorial, this section
shall not be construed to impair the right of the people to
the customary free use and enjoyment of the ocean
beaches.1
6
Thus, subsection (d) not only demonstrates that the General
Assembly did not intend subsection (a) to be read by the courts as
suggesting that the public does not have the right to use the state's
113. 329 N.C. 37,404 S.E.2d 677 (1991).
114. 95 N.C. App. 38,46, 381 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1989), rev'd, 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677
(1991).
115. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 55,404 S.E.2d at 688.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(d) (1999). North Carolina law defines "ocean beaches"
as:
the area adjacent to the ocean and ocean inlets that is subject to public trust
rights .... The landward extent of the ocean beaches is established by the
common law and interpreted and applied by the courts of this State. Natural
indicators of the landward extent of the ocean beaches include, but are not
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ocean beaches, but also may be read as a policy statement indicating
that the public does have such a right."7
The general public's expectations-reflected in the public's past
and present use of dry sand beaches and in the actions of the General
Assembly-the importance of the availability of the beaches to the
economically significant coastal tourist industry, and the fact that
state judges hold elected positions, suggest that the North Carolina
Supreme Court will not be receptive to the Whalehead plaintiffs'
contention that the public may be excluded from privately-owned dry
sand beaches. If the court chooses to protect the public right, there is
ample legal basis for such a ruling.
On the other hand, should the court nevertheless rule in favor of
the plaintiffs, the decision may not have a dramatic impact on the
public's use of many of the dry sand beaches of the state. In the
Whalehead setting, the beaches in question are natural dry sand
beaches. Many beaches in North Carolina have been subject to a
beach nourishment project, and many more are likely to be in the
future. Such dry sand beaches are public beaches.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental question of the exact location of the seaward
boundary line of privately-owned oceanfront property is answered by
state and federal statutes and North Carolina case law. Along natural
dry sand beaches, the title to privately-owned oceanfront property
includes the dry sand. As the storms, wind, and waves shift the
contours of natural dry sand beaches, the boundary line moves with
such changes, always leaving the title to the dry sand beach in the
hands of the adjacent oceanfront property owner and title to the wet
sand in the state. However, where the beaches have been nourished
and appropriate procedures have been followed, the dry sand beach is
part of the state's public trust lands. The boundary of privately-
owned oceanfront property in such circumstances would not be an
ambulatory boundary, but one fixed by the location of the mean high-
water mark prior to the initiation of the nourishment project.
Whether the location of the boundary along natural dry sand beaches
is determinative of the public right of use is a separate question.
117. See also § 113A-134.1(b) ("The public has traditionally fully enjoyed the State's
beaches and coastal waters and public access to and use of the beaches and coastal waters
.... The General Assembly finds that the beaches and coastal waters ... have been
customarily and freely used and enjoyed by people throughout the State.") (emphasis
added).
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Existing case law in North Carolina and some other jurisdictions
strongly suggests that the location of the boundary is not
determinative. Ultimately, the answer to that question depends on
the willingness of the North Carolina courts to recognize the long-
standing public expectation that the dry sand beaches are a public
resource open to all.
1898 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
